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The Difficult Road to Gerillai~y'aReunilication:
Prrlrsyecrs for the Forgotten Outsider

By:Clu-isiopher P. Ball

Honors Seuior Thesis
March 27,1994

In November 1989 the Berlin Wall came down.
divided city and nation.

It represented the end of a

People across the uorld sat in euphoric disbelief as

the wall of political, economic, socia.1, and cultural differences came down,
thus freeing millions who had long been separated from their family and
friends.

The world experienced a short glimpse of serenity and harmony on

that da.y a.s the east and west Berliners joined together in singing, "Such a.
da.y, so \+onderful a.s today."
This event wa.s one of many during the great milestone year of 1989.
Cries of joy and freedom echoed from all corners of the world a.s the former
communist countries of Eastern Europe broke down, bringing about the collapse
of the "Evil Empire" tha.t the free nations had grown to know and fear.

But

the real problem turned out to period of collapse that people throughout the
globe had long anticipated brought with it, however, new uncertainties a.nd
problems of va.st proportion that had not been included in the thoughts and
rhetoric about the end of the cold war.

The only problem expected was the

transition from the centrally-pla.nned economies to free market economies.

The

reality included the transition from political systems, social structures, and
cultural traditions embedded in the lives of every individual who lived in
such rigid regimes.
From a Western perspective, I believe, it was largely perceived that
these new problems would quickly be solved, that these economies would be
reconstructed into the shape of western free-market democracies, a.nd that the
world would then go on about its business.

In light of the 1989 events, there

wa.s a resurgence of economic 1itera.ture on the functions of Soviet-style
economies a.s well as new articles and books on transition.

Debates ensued on

topics of privatization, macro and micro stability, adjustment in the fiscal
sector, etc.

All this literature was valuable a.nd necessary, but seemed only

to have considered half of the situation.

As we should have 1ea.rned by now,

progress and change rarely take such a. simple, and admittedly one-sided, form.
Instead, progress a.nd change tend to move in a more dialectic fashion, similar
to tha.t suggested by Hegel and ~arx.'

With this in mind, i t should seem

obvious that the breakdown of Eastern Europe would not simply be fixed by the
West, and its economy a.dded to the growing world economy as new, unexploited
markets at Western disposal.

Eastern Europe, on the other hand, would

dramatically influence the Western world, especially the region in close
proximity, namely Western Europe.

Ea,stern Europe would form a new synthesis

from the old and the new on both sides of the ea.st-west wall.

Joa.chim

Nawrocki notes Germany's specific importance in Europe when he writes:
Germa.ny lies in the heart of a merging Europe. It is not
merely a bridge between the East and West but a. country with an
economic and political potential on which many people, especia.1 ly
in Eastern Europe, pin their hopes . . . [flurthermore, it continues
to be one of the Communities most productive members in spite of
the massive eco omic problems requiring solution in the new
federal states.$
This kind of synthetic change, or impact, appears to have affected the
Western nations largely through the changes in focus of politics in Western
countries, cha.nges in domestic and international economic policies, and
changes in the world ma-rkets. As far as the political and economic policies,
1

This refers to Hegel's philosophical view of change through, what he
cal I ecl Aufhebungi the dial ectica.1 process tha.t contains the simul ta.neous
destruction, creation, and sustenance of the thesis and anti-thesis. This
process in turn leads to the forma.tion of a third, new state which Hegel
called, synthesis. Furthermore, I refer here to Marx's application of Hegel's
dialectic to the physical as well as the metaphysica.1 world. Here we can view
the western Laender before 1989 as the thesis, and the ea.stern Laender before
1989 as the anti-thesis, and, therefore, whatever the future outcome of
Germa.npfs reunifica.tion will be the synthesis.
2
Joachim Nawrocki, The Germams Are United Aga.in - From Division To
Unity: The Process of Growing Together -. (Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany :
Inter Nationes Bonn, C199311, p.27.
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this change can best be seen in the change in defense spending in the USA.
One of the most obvious exa.mples in a broader sense, however, is the collapse
of the European exchange-rate mechanism (ERM).

Since Germany had been the

anchor and source of stability for the ERN its economy subsequently became the
source of instability for the ERM after reunification.

As Germa.ny1s

Bundesbank raised its interest rates to keep inflation under control the other
ERM members were forced to raise their interest rates to avoid depreciation of
their currencies against the D-mark.

This worsened the recession outside

Germany where demand was already slowing.

Finally, in August of 1993 the ERM

loosened its margin of fluctuation from 2% to 15% and thus the ERM ceased to
effectively exist. 3
lnside the new Germany (east and west) the signs of a hegelian Aufhebung
are more noticeable.

As Vogt has pointed out, "the basic problem is... how to

fit a less advanced, substantially protected economy into a more advanced
economy guided by a stra.tegy of global ization. " 4

Vogt' s idea is actual I y very

complex and closer to the wholistic approach to tra.nsition which is needed.
By this 1 mea.n, he recognizes the need for more than a mere transition for the
former East.

Unfortunately, however, it is clear that Vogt himself overlooks

the need for extreme change in the west German side as well.

In the above

mentioned excerpt he even states that the problem is "to fitw the old "into"
the new.

While he was at least partially right, he ignored that the process

was not one of adoption but one of unification, which implies the union of two
parts to form a new whole and thus requires reform on both sides.
Economically, this process has drained Western Germany's financial resources,
--

3

"Europe's Moneta.ry Union : From here to EMU." Economist, October 23,

1993, p. 25.

4

Roy Vogt, "Transforming the Former GDR into a Ma.rket Economy,"
Comparative Economic Studies Vol. XXXlV No.2-3 (Fall-Winter 1992) : 68-69.
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simultaneously raising income ta.xes to the highest level in Europe and
increasing the federal deficit to 5.25% of GDP in 1993 and still higher in
1994.'

For example, in the former East the capital goods remain old and

geared toward distorted environmental and energy costs.

This is because it was oriented to the COMECON'

is still distorted.
many distortions.
COMECON countries.

The trade structure
which had

These distortions resulted in 72% of its exports going to

-

On the positive side, recently it has been noted that

there is some strong economic growth in the eastern states, notably in the
manufacturing sector. 8
While there has been great economic and - at least officially political reunification, the social and psychological fabric of Germany has
perhaps been torn further apa.rt. As the new Laender are slowly being
tra.nsformed into "the most modern region of ~ u r o ~ ethe
" ~social differences
and problems are quickly escalating.

Along with economic freedom for the East

Germans came the freedom "to face an uncertain future, freedom to lose a job,
[andl to 1 ose support nets. "lo

Furthermore, economic freedoms no longer

seemed so great a.s Germany continually increased its government debt, and as
its recession continued - caused in part by reunification during a world wide
recession.

La.stly, employment was made difficult due to an excess supply of

labor (including asylum seekers) and the structural rigidities in the German
labor market.
5

Although some economic recovery has begun in Germany and is

"Bundesbank: Overall Public Deficit To Rea.ch Record Levels in 1993,"
The Week in Germany, December 17, 1993, p. 4.
6
The COMECON was the Ea,stern counterpart to the European Common Market in
the West.
7
Horst Siebert, "The Integration of Germany : Real Economic Adjustment,"
European Economic Review 35 (1991) : 595-563.
"Bundesbank Calls For "Wa,ge Differentiation," Sees Recession
Continuing." The Week In Germany, February 18, 1994, p. 4.
9
Fritz Stern, "Freedom and Its Discontents," Foreign Affairs, Volume 72
No.4 (September/October 1993) : 124.
10
Ibid. p. 110.
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expected to continue through 1994, Germa.ny is still plagued with an increasing
unemployment rate of 8.5 percent in the western states a,nd a jobless rate of
16 percent in the new federal states.

11

This appears to exacerbate the

sociological and psychological problem of rising xenophobia in various
reg ions.

The purpose of this paper is to acquire a better understanding of the
impact reunification of Germany ha.s had - and will continue to ha.ve - on the
German labor market and Germany's high unemployment that has persisted since
the early 1980s.
problem.

A wholistic approa.ch is attemped in the analysis of such a

Consequently, three different a.spects of the German economy and

society are used in an attempt to better understand and a.nalyze the current
a.nd future problems in Germany.
First, we look at the problems associated with the transition of
Soviet-type economies in their broadest context.

The view is taken that

changes are required not only in the former eastern countries, but also in the
west.

Furthermore, the changes mentioned impact the political and social

realms a.s well as the economic, and should therefore be treated accordingly.
Second, we will look at the structure of the labor market in West
Germany before unification.

This analysis will use a modified

insider-outsider model from Coe and ~ r u e ~ e r and
' ~ a combination the Phi 1 1 ips
curve model a.nd target-real-wage-bargaining model to look at the rigid

11

"Annual Report : Government Expects Modest Growth, but Higher
Unemployment in 1994," The Week In Germany, January 28, 1994, p. 4.
l2
David T. Coe and Thomas Krueger, "Wage Determination, the Natural Rate
of Unemployment, and Potential Output," IMF Occasional Faper #75 (1990) :
116-120.

Ball - 6
bargaining structure o f the labor ma.rket a.nd their effects on
quasi-equilibrium levels of unemployment.
Third? s study is done of the east-west migration in Germany from the
mid-to-early eighties through reunifica.tion (migration is continuing as this
paper is being written).

Here no specific model is used consistently, but the

information from severa.1 migration models are used in combination to gain
grea-ter insight into the determinants of migration.

These include: wage

differentials, the high, fixed up-front migration costs, the size of the home
city, the age of the migra.tor, and the uncerta.inty involved in migration
decisions.

The last factor is la.rgely restricted to uncerta.inty as it rela.tes

to the likelihood of finding a job in the new market.

One of the conclusions

drawn here is tha,t wage differentials tend to play a smaller role in the
decision to migra.te than had been previously thought, in partial agreement
with the 1itera.ture on the va.lue of wa.iting option.
The conclusion is then dra.wn that while the increased supply of labor as
a result of migration flows from the eastern Laender ma.y have maintained some
upward pressure on the unemployment figures, the high unemployment is la.rgely
due to the labor market structures - both micro and macro - in Germa.ny.

As

a

result of these rigidities, unemployment will be perpetuated by many of the
fiscal policies of Germany which are intended to keep infla.tion under control
through high interest rates.

Furthermore, assuming tha.t future labor ma.rkets

in Germany will behave simila.rly to the former west German markets and that
restrictive monetary policies will continue to accompany Germany's
reunification, we can predict with some confidence that high unemployment
levels will persist in the future even a.fter east-west migration has rea.ched a
natural equilibrium.

Finally, the result of the most recent events are
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analyzed using our va.rious models in a hope to better understand not only the
present but also the future situation in Germany.

In 1989, the Federa.1 Republic of Germany (FRG) seemed to be continuing
its decade long slow but stea.dy economic upswing.

In the face of possible

ca,pacity constraints, West Germany had managed to grow at a surprising 4
percent over the last yea.r with well behaving infla.tion, a decreasing public
sector debt and strong foreign and domestic demand.

Furthermore, strong

business investment suggested that supply constraints elicited a ca.pacity
widening response.

This was confirmed by developments in the labor market

where job creation exceeded the expanding labor force leading to a decline in
the unemployn~ent ra.te of 3/4 of 1 percentage point over the last year. 13
Despite this minor decline in the unemployment rate, unemployment
remined a thorn in this growing economy's side.

Unemployment in the Federal

Republic of Germany had been unusually high throughout the f980s, with an
average rate of 7.82% from 1984 to 1989.

As mentioned above, this persistent

unemployment was pa.rtiaily a result of the rigidity in the German labor
market.

Due to cohesive unionization and its style of collective wage

bargaining, the German labor market was able to maintain a quasi-equilibrium
level of unemployment that exceeded the natural unemployment ra.te. One of the
microeconomic explanations of high German unemployment distinguishes between
insiders and outsiders in the wage bargaining process, where the unemployed
(outsiders) have little influence on the bargaining. (See model presented
below.)

Following this microeconomic approach is an aggregate look at the

l3
Leslie Lipschitz. "Introduction and Overview," Germa.n Unification:
Economic Issues. IMF Occassional Papers #75,(1990) p. 2.

same problem using a. combination of the Phillips curve model and the
target-real-wage-bargaining model.

Both models are taken from Coe and

Krueger. 1 4
Let us first examine a situation where the insiders (employees) have no
market power.

(See Appendix A for graph.)

outsiders would be i d o

The labor demand curve for

(upper panel) which would face an elastic supply curve

at the reservation wage ( w r ) , which is a function of the good unemployment
benefits and other social nets in Germany.

Under these conditions,

there

would be an equilibrium at A which results in aggregate employment (E')
panel) and an unemployment rate of

(u'),

(lower

which reflects the voluntary,

natural, ra.te of unemployment.
Now let us look at the situation where the insiders

-

represented by

unions in Germany's case - have full market power and the outsiders have
little influence in the wage bargaining.

First, assuming a. constant level of

capital and technology, the firm is a price taker a.nd attempts to maximize
profits by choosing labor inputs of insiders at wage wi and outsider at wage
wr.

Now the labor demand curve ldo

and the curve i d l

would represent the demand for insiders

would represent the outsiders.

The difference between these

two curves equals the turnover cost per employee c which is some function of
the training costs, as well as the severance pay or insiders ability to resist
being replaced by outsiders and their lack of cooperation with the new
employees.
Insiders will set wa.ge wi to maximize their joint wage income.
they face potential competition for jobs with outsiders.

However,

Therefore, in order

to avoid being replaced by outsiders this wage wi should not exceed the
14

Da.vid T. Coe and Thomas Krueger. "Wage Determina.tion, the Natural Rate
of Unemployment, and Potential Output," German Unification: Economic Issues.
IMF Occassional Paper #75,(1990) p. 117-120.

outsiders reservation wage (wr)I5 by more than the turnover-cost differential

.

The insiders' labor supply curve depends on the number of insiders and becomes
vertical a.t the level where insiders engage in the va.ge negotiating process.
This reflects the assumption that insiders do not take the welfare of the
outsiders into consideration.

For an initial insider employment level of eo,

the resulting la.bor supply curve for insiders is lS(e0).

Equilibrium is at A,

where the labor demand curve for insiders intersects their labor supply curve.
Although current wages exceed the reservation wage, outsiders are unable to
find jobs beca.use the turnover cost makes their employment unprofitable for
the firm.

Unemployment at Uo, which is above the natural rate of

unemployment, can exist as a quasi-equilibrium because there are no forces in
the labor market that would reduce unemployment to the natura.1 rate.
Starting from the equilibrium at A, suppose the economy is subjected to
an unanticipated negative demand or supply shock and that, at the time! a.gents
perceive this shock to be permanent.

To avoid complicating the graphs in

Appendix A, let the labor demand schedule for insiders shift down from 1 d 0 to

ldl,

the previous outsider demand schedule (the new demand schedule for

outsiders is not shown here).

The new equilibrium is at B, with lower wages

(ril<wiO) less a.ggregate employment (El<EO), and higher unemployment (UI>UO)
as some former insiders become unemployed, that is, become outsiders.

Once

the economy settles at this quasi-equilibrium there are again no forces in the
la.bor market to reduce unemployment either to its previous level or to the
natural rate.
Consider now a reversal of the initial shock and a return to the labor
dema.nd schedules to their original positions in Appendix A.
15

Insiders would

The reservation is the minimum wage a worker will accept given their
percieved worth and percieved employment opprtunities. Often, it is also a
function of the wage they recieved in their previous job.
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prefer moving to the new equilibrium B', but are constrained in their wage
demand by outsiders competing for their jobs.

To a.void being laid off,

insiders wi 1 1 not demand wages higher than (wr + c).

At this vage

-

plus an

increased demand for labor - it is profitable for the firms to hire more
3.t the reservation wage.

-

additional workers

i e-,-eli

"period" thsse

5ntr3nts become insiders and s new ec;gi!ihrixa is rea-:h?d

31

:?ere

fist.!

1 ;impi:y~f~ :q~-jl?+

3

W ~ V E J

o f ( w r + ci.

In the subsequent

T n e r e ~ e v s n i i n i d ~ rj ? b g r

suppiy curve becomes lste2), and D will be the new equilibrium.
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~

:
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Even though

t i c ~ n s tlaye returned to their. c.r i : i n > 1 1 st!? 1 s!

unempi~vment does not return to its pre-shock level (U2-U,j~.
The insidsr-outsider model shows how the German wage bargaining can lead
to quasi-equilibrium levsls of unemployment that evceed the natural rat5 when

the insiders h s v e the market power.

Furthermore, it show ktou a series of

s1-1ppI)i'
shucks m y rztchet u p unemployr?.enteven when the surpiy shcc1::s 2re
;ubselquently reversed.

The insider-outsider model appezrs t13 be consistent

with the unemployment developments in West Germa.ny during the 1970s and 1980s,
but the assumptions concerning the differences between insiders and outsiders
m3u be a bit extreme.

Therefore, a look at the following combination of the

Phillips curve model and the target-real-wage-bargaining model helps to shed
further I ight on the stubbornly high unemployment rate in the FRG frdm a
macroeconomic point of view with less extreme assumptions.
The typical Phillips curve expresses a direct relationship between
inflation a.nd employment.

"The focus in this alternative to the Phil lips

curve is on the equilibrium relationship between the levels of

-

a s opposed to

in - re21 wsgss a n i labor productivity implyin: r n z t the growth or

L r l e ch2n5es

L .
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serious implications for the inflation stability in Germany as it is related
to the level of unemployment.

By this 1 mean that such a. model reveals how a

quasi-macroequilibrium can be a.chieved with stable inflation and an
unemployment level that remains higher than the na.tural rate.

The following

graphical illustration clarifies this relationship further. 17
The top pa,nel of Appendix B shows the expectations-augmented Phillips
curve (PC), which reflects the negative relationship between the nominal wage
inflation i Awl and unemployment ( U ) .

The vertical long-run Phillips curve

represents the natural rate of unemployment at ll*.

The aggregate demand

schedule AD reflects a positive relationship between the nominal wage
inflation and unemployment.
Consider the impact of a restrictive policy to reduce nomina.1 wage and
price inflation.
inflation

Beginning at the equilibrium point A, with nomina.1 wage

hifo
end

the naturwl rate of unemployment u * .

First, aggregate

demand would be reduced, shifting ADO to ADl, a.nd unemployment would increase
from U' to U1.

Then the decl ines in wage inf 1a.tion would be incorporated into

the inflation expectations, the Phillips curve (PCO) shifts inward to PC1,
which subsequently reduces real wages and unemployment.
continues to move inward

The Phillips curve

(to PC7) until it reaches the natural unemployment
L

rate at 11"nd

the vage a.nd price inflation have reached Awl.

Thus under

normal Phillips conditions a restrictive monetary policy has achieved its
goals, resulting in lover, stable price and vage inflation while reaching a
new equilibrium at the natural rate of unemployment along the long-run
Phi 1 1 ips curve.

id

"

Ibid. p.118
Foramathematical e x p 1 a . n a t i o n s e e A p p e n d i x C .
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In the lol..!er panel of Appendix B, the real-wage-bargaining curve I R W B )
replaces the Phillips curve.

The difference between the two curves lies in

the catch-up variable which has been added and influences the nominal wage
growth so that i t reflects the deviation of real wages from their target level
(as displayed in equation (1) in Appendix C ) .
will shift

-

The real-wage-bargaining curve

as did the Phillips curve - with cha.nges in expected inflation.

Given the same restrictive monetary policy to reduce price and wage
inflation, consider the

impact on the real-wage-bargaining model.

As before,

initially, aggregate dem3nd is reduced from ADO to AD1, nominal wage growth
declined to Atvi a.nd unemployment increases to U1.

Real wages and their

target levels also decline with the rise in unemployment.

After the increase

in unemployment has been incorporated into the real-wage-bargaining curve as a
reduction of the target level of real wages, there is no further downward
pressure on the growth of real wages resulting from low employment.
Furthermore, aggregate demand shifts further down and labor demand declines
relative to the previous situation implied by the Phillips curve because real
wages do not continue to decline.

Also. as the wage inflation's decline is

incorporated into expectations, there is extended downward pressure on nominal
wage growth.

Finally, the real-wage-bargaining curve (RWBi shifts down until

inflation is reduced to 3 v 2 .
The main difference in the results of these two models is obvious.
While both attain stable levels of price and wage inflation, the Phillips
model returns the economy to an equilibrium level equal to the natural rate of
unemployment and the real-wage-bargaining model brings the economy to a
quasi-equilibrium level that exceeds the natural rate of unemployment.
"Empirical tests of the alternative models indicate that aggregate wage
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developments in west Germany a.re better described by the real-wage-bargaining
mode 1 than by the Phi 1 1 ips curve/natural rate model. "la
In brief, the relationship between these two models and Germany's
economic problems is a circular one.

By allowing the unions and other

"insiders" greater clout in the labor market than the "outsiders" leads to
higher wages and unemployment.

The Germa.n government fears inflation

partially beca.use of the high wages and therefore, choosing low infla.tion over
low unemployment, keeps the interest rate high.

A high interest rate in turn

slows down the economic recovery which prevents new jobs from being created,
thus keeping unemployment high through a slow economic recovery.

This high

unemployment furthers the power of the "insiders" relative to the "outsiders"
therby bringing us back to the beginning of the circle.
Using these two models - Insider/Outsider and the Target-Real-WageBargaining -

a.

tight monetary policy and a high level insider ma.rket control

will lead to sta.ble high unemployment that exceeds the natural rate of
unemployment.

At first glance, a reversal of some of these shocks ma.y be

suggested, but as we sa.w in the example used with the micro model this may
lead to even higher unemployment due to the rigid bargaining structure.
Moreover, such a prescription merely leads to short term solutions.

A better

solution might be to a.ttempt to lower either the reservation wage or the
turnovercost.

A retraining program for the unemployed - especially for those

workers laid off due to structural changes - would certainly lower the
turnover cost by remo\~ing,or at least greatly reducing, the firm's training
cost per individual hired.
reservation wage.

On the other hand, this could easily raise the

Provided the change in the turnover cost exceeds the change

in the reservation wage ( & > A w r ) , a decrease in unemployment should follow.
lbid. p.120
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At the very least, this should narrow the range of wages in which the insiders
bargain! thus reducing some of their market power.
However, a better outcome may result naturally in the future.

As

Germa.ny continues its training policy in the new Laender these neu workers
will be trained for industrial jobs19 .

As in our earlier example, this

outcome should lower the turnover cost to firms.

Furthermore, as many of

these new and trained workers migrate from east to west the labor supply will
increase, thus putting downward pressure on the reservation wage.

Here, the

squeeze of the bargaining range for insiders would be narrowed greatly and,
hopefully, result in a greater decrease in unemployment.

This, of course,

assumes the reservation wage to be a.ffected by the labor supply in a C1a.ssical
sense.

The issue of migration has many ramifications in our analysis of the
German labor market during reunifimtion.

There are obvious problems for east

Germa-ny. First, there is an initial "brain drain" of the top and brightest
workers, researchers, and scholars in the east who migrate west.

Second,

since migration appears to also be a function of age, more young workers
migrate out of the east than do older workers.

Third, while there is some

reverse migration, "reverse migrants are often close to retirement and a.re
likely to engage primarily in consumptive activities.. . Migration may

l9

Recent reports suggest that such tra.ining practices are being undertaken
in Germany with around 50 billion DM being spent on these programs in the
former east.
Source: "Economic Trends in Unified Germany 1992-1993-1994,"
Dokumentation, Treuhandanstalt, December 1993, p. 4.
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therefore have negative consequences for ca.pita.1 format ion and economic
development in East Germany. "20
Migration is nothing new to Germany.

"Migra.tion of ethnic Germans from

Ea.stern European countries and the eastern parts of the German Reich began
with the retreat of the defeated German army at the end of World War 1 1 . w21
After the war, nearly 18.4 million Germans who had previously lived in the
eastern part of Germany were outside the east German borders.
expelled from these outside countries between 1945 to 1950.

Many were
During this time,

nearly 4.1 million people moved back to east Germany and nearly 8 million to
west Germany. 22
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, immigration from Eastern European
countries continued at a slower rate.

However, migration within the German

borders increased during this period (from 1950 to August 13,1961 when the
Berlin wall was constructed) and over 2.6 million people migrated from east to
west Germany (see Appendix D).

Over the next period, 1960-69, there were only

around 800,000migrants and even less (around 500,000) between 1970 and 1979.
It was not until the 1980s when the communist block collapsed that migration
returned to over half its post-war levels.
in which we are most interested.

It is this most recent time period

Now, let us turn to the factors that affect

the decision to migrate and see how they rela.te to the labor models previously
explained.
(1) There appears to be a negative relationship between the individua.1'~
age and the desire to - or utility derived from - migrating.23

'

This

Michael C.Burda "The Determinants of East-West German Migration: Some
First Results," European Economic Review 37 (1993): 452-453.
Thomas Mayer. "Immigration into West Germany: Historical Perspectives
and Policy Implications," Gerrna.n Unification: Economic Issues. IMF
Occasional Paper #75, p . 130.
22
Ibid.
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relationship shows that, at least for some, the marginal benefit of migrating
minus the fixed costs associated with such an activity may not always not
exceed the marginal benefit of remaining in the home region, especially for
older individuals. 24

Since more young than old workers will migrate the skill

of these more productive and healthier workers will leave the already less
productive east and proliferate the productivity differntial between the east
and west in the future.

This productivty in the ea.st was estimated in 1990 to

be anyvhere from one-third to one-half that of the west.25 Furthermore, this
means that in an area. which badly needs to modernize, the workers most capsble
of improvement and further education are the most likely to leave.

This helps

insure that the future potential for improvement in productivity related areas
will be slow going.
( 2 ) I t appears that "current wages and recent wage growth are irrelevant

[to the migration decision], once human capital and other variables are
controlled for. " 2 6

This evidences some support in favor of the value option

of waiting hypothesis, which says an individual may derive utility from not
migrating, as shown in ( 1 ) .

It also has important policy implications that

will be elaborated later in the next section of this paper.

Briefly, it

suggests that wage differentials needed not be removed between the regions in
order for
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equilibrium in the flow of regional migration to be reached,

further implying that the up-front fixed costs of migration may be
substantial.
-Burda, "Determinants in East-West Migration," p. 458.
24
Burda refers to this as the 'Marshal 1ia.n Trigger', which is the return
at which the project (here migration) has zero present value? such that "the
return to projects in such a.n environment must exceed by a .positive margin the
'Marshallian Trigger' before they are undertaken." (For further information
see:
"The determinants of East-West German migration," p. 454-156.)
-LJ- Burda,
B. Kaffelhuschen, "Labor Migration," European Economic Review (October
1992) : 1462.
26

Burda, Leterminants in East-West Migration," p. 458.

Understanding migration might help us determine that there exists some
validity to the insider-outsider model previously explained.

By this I mean

that there is certainly little downward pressure on the wage inflation since
labor supply iat least as it relates to levels of migration) is not largely
influenced by the level of wages.

This is in contrast to classical thinking

that claims the higher the wage level in one area rela.tive to another the
greater the supply of labor in the higher wage area

-

as long as the ma.rgina1

benefits exceeds the marginal costs of changing jobs - in the long run
lowering wages.

The wage differential would reach an equilibrium level where

the only wage differential would be related to differences in working
conditions iie. if in the same industry, the wage difference would reflect the
number of hours worked, levels of stress, non-wage benefits, etc.) However,
the independence of the migration decision from the wage levels shows that
insiders are left pith much more market power than outsiders.

In short, this

tactor does not say that the wage determination is completel~independent of
the labor supply, but that the portion of the labor supply that is made up of
the increased number of migrants from the east is not merely due to the higher
wages in the west.

The wage structure is a function of other factors which

have been explained in the insiderioutsider model and not a function of the
factors in the migration decision, although the two are related.
( 3 ) "The role of uncertainty seems to be a two-edged sword: while

increases in uncertainty raise the option value of waiting, risk aversion on
the part of agents may encourage migration as a. risk reduction measure.

"27

Here uncer,tainty is mainly seen in its relation to job prospects in the "home"
and nabroad" markets, where increases in unemployment in a given market
increase the uncertainty for individuals in the same market.

Using the idea
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behind the 'Marsha.llian Trigger' we can see that the side of the proverbial
sword on which a worker finds himself depends on the marginal levels of
uncertainty in each market.

Therefore, we can logically conclude tha.t a.s long

as unemployment remains higher in the new La,ender than it is in the west,
there will continue to be some unspecified level of migra.tion from the east to
west which is positively rela.ted to the unemployment differential between the
two regions.

With the benefit of hindsight we might also conclude that this

helps explain the extremely large labor flows at the initial reunification,
given the high levels of uncertainty in the east with respect to not only the
unemployment levels but also the uncertainty of microeconomic stability, such
as availability of food and other essentials, as well as the insurmounta.ble
political and socia.1 uncertainty that existed a.t the time.

Furthermore, until

the other Eastern European countries get their economic and political
situations under control, continued migration from these countries should be
expected.
(4)

Finally, there appears to be strong statistical evidence that

suggests a negative relationship between the size - or degree of urba.nization

- of the "hone" city and the decision to migra.te.28

This is possibly

explained in that the grea.ter the degree of urba.nization, the better the
opportunities in

2.

given city, thus the more reason to stay.

In our previous

terms, this would mean a higher value is given to the option to wait, implying
that future migration should slow - for reasons other than merely the
improvements in the standard of living and wage levels in the new La.ender - as
modernization is continued.
Now that we better understand some of the factors that influence the
decision to migrate for the individual, let us turn to the social and
25

Burda, "Determinants of East-West Migration," p. 458.
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political impact migration has in aggrega.te on Germany. After Morld War I 1
xenophobia and anti-foreigner sentiment was necessarily low in Germany.
During this same time period, however, immigration into Germany va.s very high,
but the German economy was growing at an astounding rate due to the so called
Wirtschaftswunder (Economic Miracle) which consequently kept unemployment

levels low.

Furthermore, because of this rapid economic expansion, foreign

workers were not only accepted, but necessary to meet the growing market
demands.

Until the la.te 1970s, this appears to have remained the case.

Germany has had a. history of being led from the top, meaning the
government or governmental leaders.
lgth century from the top.

Bismarck led Germany's unification in the

Hitler led Germany into World War I I and

controlled the economy from the top through wha.t is called negative
corporatism.

Now government and business in Germany - and many other European

nations - work together in wha.t in called "market socialism'.

It should

therefore not be surprising that the labor market also has a few (insiders)
who have much insider control over the market from the top.

This is not only

the corporate top, but also the governmental top where la.bor lea.ders hold
bureaucratic positions and negotiate with governmental officia.1~for greater
worker power and benefits.

Perha.ps over time such a top-down power structure

has become part of the German culture, but whatever the cultura.1 outcome, it
ha.s led to strong rigidities in the labor market that are capable of stable
quasi-equilibrium levels of controlled inflation a.nd high unemployment. 29
Furthermore, when Germany's economic boom slowed after the oil shocks of the
late 1970s these rigidities produced unusually high unemployment.
Consequently, the foreign workers became scapeg0a.t~for the unemployed
See Insider/Outsider and Target-Real-Wage-Bargaining models earlier
presented.
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individua.lfsproblems.

Full blown anti-foreigner sentiment, however, did not

reemerge at that stage since the economy was still growing at a steady pace.
It \.!as not until the wall vent down and the world economy entered a recession
that this negative emotion publicly returned.

Unfortunately, the flow of

immigrants and asylum seekers from former communist countries30 dramatically
increased a.long with rising unemployment.

While the relationship between the

immigration and unemployment is largely spurious, many neo-Nazis and right
wingers propgated the idea that the foreigners were taking German jobs,
increasing unemployment for native Germans, and ruining the German economy
(and culture, according to the rhetoric).

Thus, they once again sparked a

long supressed anti-foreigner sentiment.
Evidence of this can be found in the fire-bombing of the Romanian
Gypsies and Vietnamese refugees in Rostock, Germany.

For five consecutive

nights beginning on August 22, 1992, some eight hundred neo-Nazis fire-bombed
an appartment building occupied by the aforementioned refugees while crowds of
onlookers cheered.

Rather than stomping out the neo-Nazis, on August 24 the

authorities ordered all refugees out of the city.

This created, in effect,

the second "foreigner-free" city (the first was Hoyerswerda after a similar
incident in 1991).

"Most leading politicians, including Chancellor Helmut

Kohl, focused on the need to change Article 16 of the constitution, which
guarantees asylum for pol i tical refugees. "31 (Article 16 was subsequent 1 y
changed in 1993 and the number of asylum seekers entering Germany has greatly
decreased since. )

The immigrants from the East were not alone. There were also other
immigrants from less developed countries.
31
"Race Relations," 1993 Britannica Book of the Year, Encyclopedia
Britannica., Inc., Chicago, l l . , 1993, pp. 258-259.

The governmental response was probably more surprising than the action
itself.

Furthermore,

[aln opinion poll taken after the violence in Rostock found
that 19% of the voters in western Germany and 12% in eastern
Germany would vote for " a party to the right of the Christian
Democratic Union/ Chri5tia.n Social Union." The neo-fa.scist
Republican Party won 10.9% of the vote in the April electgqn in
Baden-Wuertenburg a.nd 9.9% in the May election in Berlin.
Also, 25 neo-Nazis were tried for the Rostock fire-bombing and only received
sentences of maximum prison time of eight months, suspended sentences, or
proba.tion orders.

Police identified a 75% increase in proven acts of

antiforeigner violence between 1991 a.nd 1992 and during the first 10 months of
1993 at least 20 people were killed in ra.cist- and fascist-rela.ted violence. 33
On the other hand, hope remains since the percentage of votes has not yet
reached extreme proportions and public opposition to the neo-fascist activity
has increased.

On November 8 more than 350,000 Germans marched in Berlin

protesting the antiforeigner sentiment.

Moreover, in "February 1993 the

interior minister of Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, Christian Democrat Lother
Kupfer, was forced to resign after voicing 'a certa.in understanding' for the
actions of the Rostock rioters. "34 While this provides hope for a German
future with less public support of neo-fa.scism, it insures a difficult a.nd
complex 1994 election year.

Briefly, we began with an overview of the changes which have taken place
in Eastern Europe, focusing specifically on Germany and its labor market
32

Ibid.
"Race and Ethnic Relations," 1994 Britannica. Book of the Year,
Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., Chicago, Il., 1994, p. 261.
34
I bid.
33
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transition.

It was stated tha.t the study and understanding of such change is

not only important for the country studied (here Germany), but also has many
implications for the world as a whole as we move together toward the future.
Next, the previous state of the German labor market wa.s examined using
the Insider/Outsider microeconomic model and the Phillips curve,
target-rea.1-wage-bargaining

macroeconomic model.

It was shown that Germany's

microeconomic structure encourages unemployment by allowing the insiders (the
employed ~ o r k e r s )to have much greater market power than the outsiders (the
unemployed workers).

Furthermore, according to the macro model used, the

labor market rigidities in the bargaining process places upward pressure on
the unemploynient level as well, especially under strict moneta.ry policies.
Lastly, we looked at the migration issues in Germany.

Here, we showed

that Germans have always been forced to cope with large levels of migration
into their country.

Moreover, past history shows that they ha.ve ma.na.ged to do

this while maintaining low levels of unemployment a.nd a growing Gross National
Product.

It was interpreted from this that the current levels of migration

from the former Ea.st, while possibly indirectly influencing the wage level
through a lowering of the reservation wage, are not the cause of high
unemployment figures.

On the other ha.nd, structural rigidities in the labor

market (discussed in the preceding pa.ragraph) appear to be a much more
important cause of unemployment.

In the end, it seems that migration mainly

influences the political and social construction of the country in a. negative
way as the citizens wrongly blame the economic problems on the foreigners.
This relationship wa.s evidenced by the recent rise in right wing popularity
and the anti-Auslaender (anti-foreigner) demonstrations against the Romanian
gypsies and Vietnamese in Rostock in 1992 and the subsequent demonstrations in

the streets since that time.

It should be noted here that, unfortunately for

Germany, nationalism, xenophobia, and the growth of ra.dica1 political parties
all increase as unemployment rises.

Therefore, the recent rise in these

social attitudes and the growing popularity (a.lbeit slowly) of the right wing
should not come as a surprise in the face of both increased migration and
increasing unemployment.

I would like now to turn our focus to the most recent events in Germany.
While this pa.per is being written, the unemployment figures continue to rise,
recent GNP figures promise some future economic growth (due in part to
increa,sed exports as America pulls out of the worldwide recession), the
Bundesbank maintains a cautious and somewhat tight monetary stance, and the 1G
Metall workers union recently and successfully negotiated with employers over
wage and benefit increa.ses. Lastly, during this year, 1994, elections will be
held throughout Germany and will decide on new leaders at all levels of the
government, including the Chancel lor's position, thusly named "The Super
Election Year 1994". These events a.re not all independent of each other and
are certainly not independent of the topics discussed in this paper.
The recent outcome of the negotiation between German employers a.nd the
1G Metal1 worker's union can be viewed in terms of this paper as a negative
influence on the German labor market and the economy in general.
of the negotia.tion was clearly in the labor union's favor.

The result

Employers dropped

demands for cuts in vacation time (which is currently the longest vacation
time of all the G-7 countries), a.greed to a 2 percent wage increase and
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guaranteed no layoffs for the workers.

In exchange, the workers agreed to a

more flexible work week with a minimum of 30 hours per week (down from a. 36
hour per veek minimum) and will delay for one year a Christmas bonus increase
of 10 percent, which brings the total Christmas bonus to 60 percent of one

month's salary.
While the above outcome solves the short-term problem for Germa.ny of a
labor strike that could have crippled the German economy, it also reveals a
relentlessly shortsighted approa.ch to improving the German economy a.s a whole
and will, in my opinion, lead to worse problems in the future which will
require even tougher decisions to be made.

By this I mean, that unless

Germany lowers its wa.ges and cuts back on its vacation time it will not remain
competitive in the future world market where increa.sing competition from the
East Asian tigers a.nd Japan becomes daily more intense.

In these countries

not only are the wages lower but the worker productivity levels and the hours
worked per week are higher with much lower vacation time.

This does not

include competition from the United States who is also more productive, works
more hours per veek, and has less vacation time than Germany.

Furthermore,

the U.S. has recently opened trade further through the NAFTA a.greement which
should lower the wage levels and help profits in the short run and increase
competitiveness in world markets over the longer run.

In the shorter run, as

the other G-7 countries continue to climb out of the global recession the
German interest ra.te will not be as high relative to other rates, thus,
possibly leading to a counterproductive decline in capital formation in
Germany even while Germans continue to call for international investment

incentives in Germany. 3 5

in light of the models presented, the IG Metal 1

negotiations further reveal the strength of the "Insiders", as represented by
the labor union.

Finally, the negotiations' outcome suggests there will be a

continua.nce of involuntary unemployment resulting from structural rigidities.
These results could easily have negative consequences for Europe in
general as well.

Western Europe, at the time of this paper, is still

submerged in the world recession and could very much use a strong Germany to
help pull them out.

Also, the budding European union continues to need

support in completing its economic, monetary, and political union.

Lastly,

for Eastern Europe Germany remains an important factor not only in its
financia.1 development through treaties, trade, and assistance, but also simply
as a. model of transition which offers them hope.
The recent signs of stubbornly high unemployment in the newly unified
Germany may also be viewed in terms of this paper as an obviously negative
influence on not only the Germa.n economy but also the German political a.nd
social situation.

As mentioned above, the German rates of unemployment are

high, especially in the former East Germany.

Economically this has many

negative repercussions, but as we have seen, the social implications of high
unemployment are possibly of greater importance, especially when coupled with
immigration, by leading to increased xenophobic activity.

As earlier stated,

such a.ctivity is largely a response to a misperception of the economic
situation (i.e. blaming the foreigners for unemployment rather than looking at
the structural and policy related causes of unemployment).

I t is also,

however, a.n attempt by an angry few to use foreigners as the scapegoat for
deeper problems in the country itself, which encourages the previously

35

"G-7 Na.tions Meet in Detroit to Discuss the Unemployment Crisis and Ways
to Resolve It." The Week In Germany, March 18, 1994, p. 4.

mentioned misperception to be accepted by the many.

This cycle, if continued,

will lead in the future to higher levels of anti-foreigner activity and
possibly further levels of dangerous violence and even the unfortunate
election of ra,dicals to positions of power.
To end on a positive note, the recent election, while looking ever worse
for current Chancellor Helmut Kohl, has revea.led a much welcomed resistance to
the extreme po1itica.l right.

The officia.1 start of the "Super Election Year

1994" began with votes on Parlia.ment in Lower Sa.xony.

was 4 4 . 3 percent which went to the Social Democrats.

The largest percentage
Helmut Kohl's party, the

CDU (Christian Democratic Union), received 36.4 percent of the vote, down from
the 42 percent in 1990, and will have 67 seats in the new parlia.ment. The
third major party, the Greens, won 7.4 percent.

The best news is that the

right-wing party, Repuhlikaner, only received 3.7 percent which is not enough
to win representation in the new Parlia.ment.36

This helps to alleviate

immediate fears of right-wing representation in positions with some decision
making capabilities.

Two things should, however, be noted here: 1. this is

only the beginning of the elections, therefore there is a chance, albeit slim,
that the Republikaner party ma.y still win some seats; 2 . i f the current high
interest, high unemployment policies are continued, the future chances of
right-wing power will be increased due to the susta.ined high unemployment
levels.

After a1 1 , although the 3.7 percent of votes for the Reprrbliker was

not enough to win seats, it was an increa.se from the previous 1.5 percent.

Germa.ny requires a 5 percent win in the polls in order to obtain seats
in the Parliament.
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e = lexl of employment
Where: 1' = labor supply curve
L=totalLaborforce
1" = laboa demand came
E = aggregate emplaymrnt
wl = insider wage
w'= outsider ( m a t i o n ) wage
U = aggregate memplopd
c = turnover cost per employee Tarm = n number of identical firms

Where:Aw

AD
PC
RWB

u

=nominalwageidation
= aggregate demand
=Prnpscurve
= real-wage-bargaining curve
= lmemployment

Appendix - C
The Phillips Curve and The Target-Red -Wage-Bargaining Model
Using the combination of the Phillips curve model and the
target-real -wage-bargaining model presented by Coe and ~ r u e ~ e r (Coe
l
and
Krueger ppll8-1201, we find that the focus in this alternative t o the Phillips
curve is on the equilibrium relationship between the levels of
the changes in

-

-

as opposed to

real wages and labor productivity implying that the growth of

nominal wages will be determined, in part, by a catch-up variable reflecting
...- .. -past deviations of real wages from their target level.
The relationship between the Phillips curve and the
target-real-wage-bargaining model can be expressed in the following wage
equation that combines the two models:

A w = A p q + A q @ + ~+~( U - V ) + T ~ ( W - ~ - ~ ~ - T ~ ) - ~

(1)
Let

71

<0,r2 S o , and 70 define the equilibrium relationship between the

real wage level and trend average productivity (qtr 1 .

When

72

=0

,

the

equation is close to the standard Phillips curve except that C o e and Krueger
explicitly state the trend productivity growth and the natural rate of
unemployment.

When t 2 < 0 , equation (1) is converted from a growth

relationship between real wages, productivity, and uneaployaent, to a level
relationship between the same variables.

This is shown by the long-run,

stationary ready-state form of equation (11, assuming that @-=&:
(1')

W=~+~*-(~)(U-LT)+~~

Since the level of wages is related to the level of unemployment, the
growth of wages is related to the changes in unemployment.

1

In this model, the

Coe, David 7. and Krueger, Thomas. "Wage Determination, the Natural Rate
of Unemployment, and Potential Output." German Unification: Economic Issues.
IHF Occasional Paper :75,
pp. 118-120.

1

target real wage ((w-p)

t

is determined by trend productivity and the labor

market gap, which can be thought of as a proxy for the bargaining power of
labor :
(W

-p)'= -.4

(&I
LP)+
- to.

Consider an equilibrium where expectations are realized (&-=&)and
real wages grow at the same rate as trend productivity ( A w - 4 = & " ) .
Phillips curve model ( t 2 < 0 in equation ( 1 ) )
-

-.

,

In the

it is evident the such an

equilibrium requires the unemployment to be at the natural rate (U = u ' ) .

In

the target-real-wage-bargaining model ( t 2 < 0 in equation (111, a
quasi-equilibrium can exist where unemployment is above the natural rate
provided that the real wage target level has been reduced relative to the
level of trend productivity; in terms of equation (1). it would be required
that the last two terms sum to zero:

t,(U-

LT)+ t z ( w - p - q b - t o ) - l = 0.

Empirical tests of the alternative models indicate that aggregate wage
developments in west Germany are better described by the
target-real-wage-bargaining model than by the Phillips curve model.
Therefore, we could view the persistence of high inflation in the Federal
Republic of Germany to be the result of aggregate wage formation rather than
merely a high natural rate of unemployment.

Appendix - D

Table 1 :Federal Republic of Germany : Immigration firm the East
From Eastern
Eumpean
unem~lo~ment
Countries
From GDR
Total
Rate'
1950-59

439,714

2,203,107

1960-69

221,516

618,345

2,642,821
839,861

7.8
1.3

Source: IMF Occasional Paper #75, "German Unification : Economic
Issues", 1990, p. 131.

Table 2

Federal Republic Of Germany

1991

1992

845

885

425

552

Index of Net F%duction
Consumption Goods (Vest) (1985 = 100)

122.3

119.8

Consumtion Goods (East) (2nd ha1 f 1990 = 100)

66.1

64.6

98.9

97.1

Average Total Weekly Earnings in lndusrty (DH)

New Laender
Average Total Weekly Earnings in Industry (DH)

Consumption Goods (East and Yest)

(znd ha1 f

1990 = 100)

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, 1993 Eundesrepublik Deutschland in
Zahlen.

